打击ISIS缘何治标不治本 Calming the Syrian war is more pressing than Assads fate

The spillover of the Syrian refugee crisis to Europe, followed by the Sinai, Beirut, and Paris attacks, demonstrate tragically that the threat posed by Isis has not been contained. It may be true that the organisation is turning its fire abroad because, thanks to international coalition efforts, it can no longer take territory in the region. But that will be small comfort if the result is only more attacks in Europe.

叙利亚难民危机导致大量人口流入欧洲——以及随后在西奈、贝鲁特和巴黎发生的恐怖袭击——以惨痛的方式表明，“伊斯兰国”(ISIS)构成的威胁没有被遏制住。该组织正将枪口转向海外是因为其无法再在该地区控制领土——多亏了国际联盟的努力——这或许是事实。但是，如果结果只是使欧洲遭遇更多袭击，这也只能算是小小的安慰。

Critics of existing efforts to defeat Isis have thus begun to clamour for a new strategy. The problem is that most of their proposals consist of what the United States and its partners are already doing: conducting air strikes, blocking foreign fighters and financing, countering extremist ideology, and sharing intelligence. While these efforts can and should be intensified, adding a few more coalition aeroplanes, forward air controllers, or media advisers is not going to fundamentally change the campaign’s trajectory.

批评现有打击ISIS努力的人因此开始呼吁采取新策略。问题在于他们提出的多数建议都是美国及其盟友已经在做的事：实施空袭、阻止外国战士加入ISIS并堵住该组织获取资金的渠道，打击极端主义意识形态、以及情报共享。尽管这些努力有可能、也理应有所加强，但是部署更多联盟飞机、前线空中管制(forward air controller)、或是媒体顾问，无法从根本上改变打击ISIS行动的轨迹。

The problem is not that these efforts are misplaced, it is that they target the symptoms of the problem rather than its cause. That cause, to simplify, is that tens of millions of Sunni Muslims living between Damascus and Baghdad — and millions more in Europe and elsewhere — are resentful, insecure and humiliated by the politics of the region. A small but growing minority has concluded that the only way to address the injustice they perceive is to rally to the perverted cause of the Isis.

问题不是这些努力不适当，而是它们只治标而不治本。简单来说，根本问题就是那些生活在大马士革和巴格达之间的数以千万计的——在欧洲及其他地区还有数百万——逊尼派穆斯林，他们愤怒又没有安全保障，在政治上饱受羞辱。规模较小但是人数不断增多的少数派得出结论：要解决他们所遭受的不公，唯一途径是与ISIS非正道的使命同仇敌忾。

The problem of disaffected Sunni Muslims is hardly new, but it exploded after the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the decision to disband the Iraqi army. Those moves put a major Arab power under Iranian and Shia control and disenfranchised thousands of armed Sunni men. Afterwards, Shia Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki governed in a sectarian, non-inclusive fashion, driving many Iraqi Sunnis to join an earlier version of Isis, al-Qaeda, in Iraq. In June 2014, when a significant portion of the Sunni population of the city of Mosul sided with the invading Isis against their own government, it was clear efforts to make Iraqi Sunnis feel included had failed.

逊尼派穆斯林的不满算不上什么新鲜事，但是在2003年西方入侵伊拉克、以及决定解散伊拉克军队之后，问题就变大了。这些举动将一个阿拉伯大国置于伊朗人和什叶派的控制之下，并且剥夺了成千上万的逊尼派武装分子的选举权。此后，伊拉克什叶派总理努里氠利基(Nouri al-Maliki)大搞教派主义，实行非包容的政策，促使很多伊拉克逊尼派加入了早期版本的ISIS——基地组织(al-Qaeda)。2014年6月，当摩苏尔市(Mosul)很大一部分的逊尼派与入侵的ISIS并肩对抗伊拉克政府时，旨在使伊拉克逊尼派感觉融入的努力显然已经失败。

The war in Syria has vastly exacerbated the problem. There, the Bashar al-Assad regime, backed by Shia Iran and Hizbollah, is savagely repressing a largely Sunni opposition. This wanton killing is an inspiration not just for Syrian Sunnis but for foreign fighters flowing to the region, ready to die, and kill, for their cause.

叙利亚战争使问题严重恶化。在叙利亚，以什叶派为主的伊朗和真主党(Hizbollah)所支持的巴沙尔阿萨德(Bashar al-Assad)政权，野蛮地镇压主要为逊尼派的反对派。这种肆意杀戮不仅激起了叙利亚逊尼派的反抗，而且使涌入该地区的外国战士随时准备为了他们的使命而赴死和杀戮。

Seen in these terms, the strategy we are pursuing, even if bolstered by further military action, will not destroy Isis. The conflicts and injustices in Iraq and Syria are attracting more recruits than we can possibly capture or kill.

以此看来，我们目前实行的策略即便有进一步军事行动的支撑，也不会摧毁ISIS。伊拉克和叙利亚的冲突和不公正现象正吸引着越来越多的新成员追随ISIS，我们不可能将之全部逮捕或消灭。

To deal with the causes of Isis and not the symptoms, two things are essential. The first is to empower the Sunnis of Iraq. The Baghdad government must urgently deliver on its pledges to revise outdated de-Baathification laws, employ more Sunni tribal fighters, create a National Guard, end the disproportionate detention of Sunnis, and put more police on the streets of Sunni areas. Delivering more humanitarian aid to areas freed from Isis control, and curbing the abuses of Shia militia, would also make a huge difference.

要从ISIS的发展根源（而非表面症状）入手，有两件事是必不可少的。第一件是向伊拉克逊尼派放权。伊拉克政府必须尽快兑现其修订过时的“非复兴社会党化”相关法律的承诺，启用更多的逊尼派部落战士，建立国民警卫队(National Guard)，结束大力拘捕逊尼派的行为，并且在逊尼派聚居区的街道部署更多警力。向脱离ISIS控制的区域提供更多的人道主义援助、同时阻止什叶派民兵组织的虐待行为，这也会带来巨大改变。

In Syria, the overwhelming priority needs to be on de-escalating the conflict, even if that means deferring the question of Mr Assad’s ultimate fate. The Vienna talks, for the first time including both Iran and Saudi Arabia, are a good start. A ceasefire that allows for local governance, makes humanitarian assistance possible, ends the regime’s daily bombing of Sunnis, and ultimately paves the way for a political transition would do more to undermine Isis than any of the military or political steps being discussed.

在叙利亚，缓和冲突才是重中之重，即使这意味着暂时搁置有关阿萨德最终命运的问题。首次有伊朗和沙特阿拉伯参与的维也纳会谈是个良好的开端。一份为地方治理留有余地、使人道主义援助成为可能、终结阿萨德政权每天对逊尼派进行的轰炸、并且最终为政治过渡铺平道路的停火协议，比任何正在讨论之中的军事或政治措施都更能动摇ISIS的根基。