跨太平洋伙伴关系协定已然处于困境
Donald Trump was elected US president on a platform of anti-globalism and, in particular, on a promise to change or withdraw from America’s existing Trade agreements and kill the ones in the pipeline.
唐纳德.特朗普(Donald Trump)以反对全球化、特别是承诺改变或是退出美国现有贸易协定、并且扼杀筹备中贸易协定的竞选纲领，当选了美国总统。
The Trans-Pacific Partnership was already in trouble before the election; Trump’s victory seems to have given it the coup de grace.
在大选开始前，《跨太平洋伙伴关系协定》(TPP)已然处于困境之中；特朗普的获胜似乎给了它致命一击。
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, meanwhile, now looks set to be stillborn.
与此同时，《跨大西洋贸易与投资伙伴关系协定》(TTIP)如今似乎也将胎死腹中。
That is, as far as US participation goes.
准确的说，是如果只考虑美国的参与程度的话。
What the American turn inwards means for the rest of the world is an open question.
美国人把重心转向国内对世界其他地区意味着什么，目前不得而知。
There are those who think the loss of US leadership on international economic integration will embolden protectionism elsewhere — especially as it comes on the heels of the protectionist vandalism that is Brexit — and sap the will of those who want to keep their economies open or even open them further.
有人认为，缺少美国对国际经济一体化的领导，将助长各地保护主义——特别是在英国退欧造成保护主义破坏性影响之后——并削弱那些希望保持经济开放、甚至进一步开放经济的人的意愿。
They will point to Europe, whose free-trade deal with Canada was passed by a whisker last month, and that only conditionally.
他们将以欧洲为例——欧洲与加拿大的自由贸易协定上个月勉强通过，而且是带有条件的。
But there is another possibility, which is that victory of anti-globalism in the US and the UK galvanises others to fight harder for the continued lowering of national barriers.
但是，还有另一种可能，美国和英国反全球化的胜利，会刺激其他人更加努力地继续降低国家贸易壁垒。
Cue John Key, the prime minister of New Zealand.
比如新西兰总理约翰.基(John Key)。
At the Apec (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) summit in Lima last week, he defiantly vowed to push ahead with trade integration in the Pacific.
在上周于利马召开的亚太经合组织(APEC)峰会上，他公开发誓要推进太平洋地区的贸易一体化。
He suggested tweaking the deal to make it more attractive to the Trump administration — including, jokingly, by naming it the Trump-Pacific Partnership — but, more importantly, made clear that the other TPP partners should seriously consider going ahead with the deal even without US participation.
他建议，调整协定内容以增加对特朗普政府的吸引力——包括，开玩笑地，把该协定命名为《特朗普太平洋伙伴关系协定》(Trump-Pacific Partnership)——但更重要的是，他明确表示TPP其他伙伴国应该认真考虑，在没有美国参与的情况下继续推进该协定。
Peru’s president, too, warned against protectionism and against giving up on the TPP.
秘鲁总统也告诫不要实行保护主义和放弃TPP。
Meanwhile, Beijing has responded nimbly to Trump’s election by encouraging America’s likely-to-be-spurned TPP partners to join it in building a free-trade area including China instead.
与此同时，北京方面对特朗普当选美国总统作出机敏的反应——鼓励有可能被特朗普一脚踢开的TPP伙伴国跟中国一道建立一个包括中国在内的自贸区。
The world’s second-largest economy is already involved in several regional trade initiatives that are beginning to be touted as alternatives to TPP.
这个世界第二大经济体已经加入了多个区域贸易计划，这些计划正开始被吹捧为TPP的替代品。
Australia is showing interest in the move, which would sideline the US.
澳大利亚对这一将美国剔除在外的举动表示出了兴趣。
It is a strange world when China becomes the champion of global economic openness.
中国成为全球经济开放的领头羊，这着实是个奇怪的世界。
But it is an entirely logical one, if the US does indeed decide to abdicate leadership.
但如果美国确实决定放弃领导权，这个世界完全符合逻辑。
As the FT’s Shawn Donnan puts it, when outgoing President Barack Obama met his counterparts at the Apec summit, he may have felt he is handing the Chinese leader the keys to the global economy.
正如英国《金融时报》的肖恩.唐南(Shawn Donnan)指出的那样，在即将离任的美国总统巴拉克.奥巴马(Barack Obama)在APEC峰会上与其他领导人会面时，他可能觉得他正在把全球经济的钥匙交给中国领导人。
He quotes the Peterson Institute’s Adam Posen as pointing out that: You can’t beat something with nothing, and the Chinese are offering something.
他援引彼得森国际经济研究所(Peterson Institute for International Economics)的亚当.波森(Adam Posen)的话指出：你不能两手空空地打败对方，而中国人在拿出一点东西。
To anyone who cares to notice, this brings home the continued importance of global integration but also who, in particular, leads the integration effort.
对于所有对此留心的人来说，这不仅清楚说明了全球一体化的持续重要性，还特别说明了谁在领导一体化努力。
The something that China offers is much less ambitious than the TPP — in particular, it will not include that deal’s seminal provisions on labour and environmental standards.
中国拿出的那点东西远没有TPP那么有野心——特别是它不会包括TPP在劳动力和环境标准方面具有重大影响的条款。
Moreover, trade integration led by Beijing instead of the US will mean trade integration on terms more suitable to China.
此外，由中国代替美国领导的贸易一体化将意味着，这种贸易一体化的条款将更适合中国。
That must surely be inferior — for the US and its allies — to the US-led terms and standards for Asia-Pacific economic integration to which China would eventually have to adapt, which was the big strategic prize of the TPP.
对于美国及其盟友来说，这必然不如由美国领导的亚太经济一体化的条款和标准（中国原本最终不得不适应这些条款和标准，这本是TPP的一项重大战略奖品）。
That makes Pacific trade one aspect of the bigger picture of America’s interest in the rules-based global order that it has built and maintained since the second world war — which has served it and its allies better than the alternatives of international anarchy or an order designed by its big power rivals.
这使得太平洋贸易成了美国在基于规则的全球秩序中的整体利益的一个方面（这个全球秩序由美国自二战后逐渐建立并维持，相比国际无政府状态或由美国的强大对手设计的秩序等其他选择而言，该秩序更有利于美国及其盟友）。
America first, in global politics, could quickly reveal itself as America last.
在全球政治中，美国领头可能会很快变成美国最后。
And, as Leonard Cohen, the late poet of an imperfect world, said in an interview a few years ago: you will not like what comes after America.
同时，正如抒写不完美世界的已故诗人莱昂纳德.科恩(Leonard Cohen)在多年前接受采访时说的：你不会喜欢失去美国后的样子。
America’s choice is ultimately the most consequential.
最终而言美国的选择是影响最重大的。
But the more immediate battles between openness and withdrawal from the global economy are taking place in Europe.
但开放与从全球经济中退出之间更直接的斗争正在欧洲上演。
Partly, of course, in the process of Brexit, where the fight is on over how much to raise trade barriers between the UK and its biggest trading partner.
当然，斗争部分是因为英国退欧进程，斗争的焦点是，在英国与其最大的贸易伙伴之间应该竖起多高的贸易壁垒。
But also because the EU itself is actually contributing to the cause of trade openness through two substantial deals.
但斗争也是因为欧盟本身通过两个重要协议推动贸易开放。
One is Ceta, the fraught EU-Canada trade and investment agreement that is finally passed, at least conditionally, after a Walloon hold-up.
一个是命运多舛的《综合经济与贸易协定》(CETA)。该协定是欧盟与加拿大之间的贸易和投资协定，曾因比利时瓦隆地方议会的反对而搁浅，最终得以通过（至少是有条件通过）。
That was widely seen as an embarrassment for Europe.
瓦隆插曲被广泛视为欧洲的尴尬。
But we should be clear about what the final result involved: that a big trade liberalisation package was exposed to real and messy democratic scrutiny — and that it survived the exposure.
但是我们应该明白最终结果的含义：一项重大贸易自由化方案受到真正而且复杂的民主审视，并且经受住了这种审视。
In these times, where democracy is seen as antagonistic to economic openness, that is something to celebrate.
在当前这个民主被视为与经济开放对立的时代，这一点值得庆贺。
The other, much less talked about, effort is the EU-Japan free-trade deal.
另一项很少被谈及的努力是欧盟与日本之间的自由贸易协定。
Mysteriously absent from the headlines, negotiations have been taking place for three and a half years and are nearing completion.
有关该协定的谈判已经进行了三年半，目前已接近尾声，但却令人费解地从未登上过头条。
Some think that, in pure economic terms, the prospective gains are bigger than could be had from TTIP.
一些人认为，单纯以经济条件来看，该协定的未来好处超过TTIP。
The two sides have still to agree on phasing out protection of Europe’s car market against lower barriers in food and agriculture in Japan.
双方仍然需要就逐步解除欧洲汽车市场保护以及削减日本食品与农业方面的壁垒达成一致。
Brexit focused minds; Trump’s victory must have focused them further.
英国退欧引起人们高度关注；特朗普获胜更是如此。
It is in Japan’s and the EU’s narrow self-interest to conclude the deal.
达成该协议符合日本和欧盟的自身利益。
But it is also in the broader defence of their values, and the liberal global order, that they do so with confidence and without further delay.
但他们满怀信心、不再迟疑地敲定该协议，也是对其价值观以及全球自由秩序的维护。
